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Reopening the Archive: From Hypomnesis to Legal Ontology 
 
For some time now, there has been a quietly flourishing literature on the theoretical question 
RIµODZDQGWKHDUFKLYH¶DQG\HWLWLVODPHQWHG1 that perhaps the most important homage to the 
DUFKLYHE\D µMXULGLFDO WKLQNHU¶2 has been underused to date in legal circles. Archive Fever, 
'HUULGD¶VDGGUHVVWRWKH)UHXG6RFLHW\ILQGVLWVHOIFRQVLJQHGRUDWOHDVWVXEMHFWWRWKH
threat of consignment, to an encompassing legal forgetfulness. And perhaps there is good 
reason ± even an injunction? ± not to forget that address, even when it is being dispensed with. 
It will be the unfulfilled objective of this essay to furnish such an injunction with some 
justification, by asking two ancillary questions: how might the relationship between law and 
archive be rethought following a particular reading of Archive Fever ± one in which the 
deconstruction of the Freudian archive is excavated for its legal potential? And, secondly, 
might this particular approach allow some form of engagement with ± which is not the same 
WKLQJDVDµGHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI¶WKHUHLVSOHQW\RIWKLV± the project of modern law? Not only 
insofar as the latter must, I think, be defined by its unceasing effort to establish a legal ontology; 
EXWDOVREHFDXVHDQ\ MX[WDSRVLWLRQRISUHFLVHO\ WKHVHHQWLWLHV µODZ¶DQGµWKHDUFKLYH¶PXVW
necessarily beg the same question.  
 
Recalling Law and the Archive 
 
In Files, WKHODWH&RUQHOLD9LVPDQQ¶V beautiful genealogy of the law, there emerges a history 
of the archive, in its various manifestations, as a supplement to the law. InvestigaWLQJ³KRZ
ILOHVFRQWUROWKHIRUPDOL]DWLRQDQGGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQRIWKHODZ´KRZWKH\³SURFHVVWKHVHSDUDWLRQ
of the ODZLQWRDXWKRULW\DQGDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ´3 Vismann posits a theory of the archive as the 
FRQVWDQWDQGFRQVWLWXWLYHEDUULHUWKDWLVDOZD\VVLWXDWHG³EHIRUHWKHODZ´LQWKH.DINLDQVHQVH
prohibiting access to, and yet compelling us towards, the hollow, often cavernous recesses 
which contain, disguise and suggest the ambiguous power of the law. As Thanos Zartaloudis 
explains, this investigation places the archive not only before the law, but also beside it, to the 
extent that the µSDUD-OHJDO¶Drchive invites an anaORJ\ZLWK*LRUJLR$JDPEHQ¶VGHYHORSPHQW
of theological oikonomia4. The latter envisions a vacancy at the centre of sovereign power, 
which is nevertheless exercised through governmental apparatus in a bipolar system in which 
the being and praxis of sovereign power are separated but functionally articulated in an 
economy5 /LNHZLVH 9LVPDQQ¶V DUFKLYH SHUIRUPV WKH PLQLVWHULDO IXQFWLRQ WKURXJK ZKLFK
despite its intangible and inaccessible nature, the law is be glimpsed, or suggestedILOHV³OD\
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the groundwork for the validity of law, they work toward the law, they establish an order that 
they themselves do not keep´6. This ministerial function ± which takes its form in the preamble, 
the barrier and the chancery ± is possessed of a powerful ambiguity: it is D³OHJDOWZLOLJKW]RQH´
in which the violence of the law is carried outDQGLQZKLFK³WKHODZHQFRXQWHUVZULWLQJDQG
GHFLGHVDERXWWKHGLVWLQFWLRQVWKDWDUHSHUIRUPHGLQWKHV\PEROLF´7. Importantly, this placing 
of the law beside the archive contemplates (while, of course, problematising) a distinction 
between law on one hand and archive on the other: 
 
³>WKH ODZ@ ZRUNV ZLWK WKHP >ILOHV@ DQG FUHDWHV LWVHOI IURP WKHP«LW RSHUDWHV LQ D mode of 
difference that separates it from the var\LQJIRUPDWVRIILOHV´8 
 
7KLVµGLIIHUHQFH¶KRZHYHUIOLHVLQWKHIDFHRI'HUULGHDQdifféranceDQG9LVPDQQ¶VJHQHDORJ\
RIODZDQGILOHVVLWVXQHDVLO\EHVLGH'HUULGD¶VµMXULGLFDO¶DUFKLYH While Vismann is aware of 
Archive Fever, she makes only sparse refeUHQFHWR'HUULGD¶VHVVD\LQFiles. In a later piece9, 
KRZHYHU VKH ZLOO DGGUHVV WKH HVVD\ PRUH GLUHFWO\ PDNLQJ WKH REVHUYDWLRQ WKDW 'HUULGD¶V
grammatological account of the archive LV³LQGLIIHUHQW WR WKHKLVWRU\RIDUFKLYHV´10 and, by 
extension, her own earlier genealogy.  
9LVPDQQ¶VSRLQWRIGHSDUWXUH here is 'HUULGD¶VUHOLDQFHHDUO\LQWKHHVVD\XSRQ the Greek 
word arkhé (commencement), in light of which he explores the etymological similitude of 
archons (those with authority to interpret the law) and arkheia (archives). Such a similitude is 
suggestive of a nexus between the interpretive commencement of the law and the form of the 
archive. >/LQNLQJH[DPSOHRI'HUULGD¶V WKHVLVRQ ODZ VLPLODULW\ZLWKDUFKLYHDV VRPHWKLQJ
which entails decision and precedent] ³'HUULGDSUHVHQWV>WKHDUFKLYH@DVDform of law´11. 
But this, ViVPDQQDUJXHVLVWR³GLVUHJDUG>«] something in the genesis of the rule of law 
IURPWKHDUFKLYHZKLFKFRXOGEHFDOOHGWKHLPSHULDOIDFWRU´12. While 'HUULGD LQ9LVPDQQ¶V 
reading, renders the interpretation of archives commensurate with ruling authority and thus 
invests the archive with the source of WKH ODZ LQ WKH VHQVH RI WKH µUXOH RI ODZ¶ a more 
FRPSUHKHQVLYH KLVWRU\ RI µODZ DQG WKH DUFKLYH¶ ZLOO UHYHDO WKDW LW LV QRW XQWLO WKH ,PSHULDO
5RPDQWUDGLWLRQWKDWZHZLWQHVVDQ³DVFHUWDLQDEOHPRPHQWLQWLPHZKHQWKHDUFKLYHEHFRPHV
WKHUXOHRIODZ´13. To begin with, the Greek arkhé does not coincide with any habitual practice 
of consulting archives as sources of law; moreover, explains Vismann, there is a telling event, 
in the 6th century, ZKHQ-XVWLQLDQ³RUGHUHGDFRPSOHWHUHYLHZRIWKHDUFKLYHV¶OHJDOWH[WVVR





of rule and law begins after reference to archived textVKDVEHHQDEROLVKHG´15: as a result, the 
possibility of referring to a beginning that is endowed with law (the possibility, that is, of law 
being founded upon a legal rule as opposed to more the simple political authority that invests 
archons with the right of interpretation) depends precisely on the historical moment in which 
the archives are consolidated, transformed into the rule of law but losing in the process their 
µDUFKLYDO¶FKDUDFWHU. Derrida is in error, then, when he equates the archive with the law, and 
when he reads both µUXOH¶DQGµODZ¶LQWRWKHFRQFHSWarkhé.  
For Vismann, this equivalence of law and archive could only have taken its cue from the 
law of the archive, namely that ³LWSUHFHGHV´16. From the observation that the archive and the 
law are similar in structure and function, we are led to the apparently contentious conclusion 
that ³>W@KHDEVWUDFWODZLVQRWKLQJEXWDYLUWXDODUFKLYHLWSUHFHGHVWKHLQGLYLGXDOFDVHMXVWDV
WKH DUFKLYH WH[WV SUHFHGH FXUUHQW RQHV´17. It would appear, then, that the structure of 
³SUHFHGHQW´LVQRWDVXIILFLHQWO\MXULGLFDOPRWLIZLWKZKLFKWRMXVWLI\WKH³FRQYHUJHQFHRIODZ
DQGDUFKLYH´, precisely where history indicates, to the contrary, their mutual exclusion in the 
Justinian event. This event notwithstanding, however; surely an ontological, if not a 
Foucaultian, anxiety must niggle at this thread of reasoning: for surely this history is only 
possible RQWKHEDVLVRIDQDSSDUHQWGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ³ODZ´DQG³DUFKLYH´LQWKHILUVWSODFH
and (to further compound the issue) EHWZHHQ³ODZ´DQGVRPHWKLQJFDOOHG³DEVWUDFWODZ´LQWKH
VHFRQG :KDW RQH PLJKW DVN LV WKH VWDWXV RI WKLV ³ODZ´ WKDW LV QHLWKHU ³DEVWUDFW´ QRU
FRPPHQVXUDWHZLWK³DUFKLYH´"18 
Any demand for a legal ontology is overshadowed by the more pressing matter of 
methodology in this later essay (if not in Files). Importantly: it is not that Archive Fever is 
without value, for Vismann; but that it is one of at least two available methods. To the science 
of arkhé-ORJ\³WKHVFLHQFHRIWKHFRPPHQFHPHQW´ZKLFKVHHPLQJO\PRUHDSSURSULDWHO\LQ
+HLGHJJHULDQ IDVKLRQ ³UHDGV D EHJLQQLQJ arkhé) back into the origins and thus arrives 
unmistakeQO\DWWKHUXOHRIODZ´VKH RSSRVHVDQGLVDSURSRQHQWRI³DQDUFKLYHDUFKDHRORJ\´
ZKLFK³VWHSVRXWRIWKHV\PEROLFRUGHU´UHIHUULQJWR³WKDWZKLFKGRHVQRWVSHDNWKHVSDFHRI
WKHDUFKLYH«´19. Putting aside for the moment the fact that Derrida had, long before Archive 
Fever, addressed the problems inhering in any archaeology of silence20, the justification for 
this opposition for Vismann appears to lie in the grammatological incapacity to grapple with 
the ³>P@DWHULDOFRQGLWLRQVVXFKDVODFNRIVSDFH DQGILUHGFOD\´WKDWGLFWDWHWKH relationship of 
archives to the law; but which are precisely conditions ³IDOO[ing] outside the perception of a 
MXULGLFDOWKLQNLQJRIWKHDUFKLYH´21. Too much law, then; and too little materiality ± this is the 
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sacrifice undertaken by a grammatological account of the archive. By contrast 9LVPDQQ¶V 
genealogy would reveal point of HPHUJHQFH RI WKH µUXOH RI ODZ¶ ZKLFK LV WR VD\ WKH VHOI-
perpetuating, self-containing capacity of rules upon which the very existence of the modern 
law now relies and over which its postulates must agonise: the journey through archival 
materiality thus pre-emptively usurps the quest for legal ontology. 
In what remains of this essay, I will consider precisely these two, related, problems ± legal 
ontology DQGµPDWHULDOLW\¶ ± in contemplation of the juridical archive of Archive Fever. In the 
first place, the archival structure, I will argue, is necessary to, and prefigured in, the law, in its 
modern (and arguably only) incarnation22: a self-generating and self-referential system of 
norms perpetuated in accordance with the rule of law, with the ever-present possibility of 
UHIHUULQJµEDFN¶DQGZULWLQJDQHZ7RHVWDEOLVKWKLVSRLQWLVWRWXUQ9LVPDQQ¶VFULWLTXHRQLWV
head: we must determiQHWKHDUFKLYDOQDWXUHRI³WKHODZ´first, if we are to use it at all ± let 
alone to investigate its coexistence with media. Incidentally, to follow a path through 
deconstruction to the question of archival-legal ontology is all the more pressing since it stands 
in the shadow of the already-identified achievement of Files in providing an (Agambian) 
oikonomic model of the differentiated, yet economically coupled, law-and-archive, in which 
³the formal self-generativity of the so-FDOOHGPRGHUQIRUPRIODZ« reproduces further the 
myth of self-HPHUJHQFHWKURXJKWKHDSSDUDWXVHVRILWVUHFRUGLQJGHYLFHV´23.  
Secondly, moreover, I am PLQGIXOWKDWWKHYHU\SRLQWRIGHFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶VµMXULGLFDOWKRXJKW¶
is to distinguish law WKH ³SURJUDPPDEOH DSSOLFDWLRQ RU XQIROGLQJ RI D FDOFXODEOH SURFHVV´
ZKLFK ³PLJKW EH OHJDO´ EXW ³ZRXOG QRW EH MXVW´24 from justice: that which awaits us and 
commands us under pain of urgency to decide on the particular, and yet which is therefore only 
approximated in the (im)possible decision to ³JR WKURXJK WKH RUGHDO RI WKH XQGHFLGDEOH´, 
something ³IRUHLJQWRWKHRUGHURIWKHFDOFXODEOHDQGWKHUXOH´25. What avenue of inquiry could 
possibly remain in respect of this calculable order, which exists only as a generative antithesis 
WRµGHFRQVWUXFWLRQDVMXVWLFH¶" Both of these points, I think, might find some comfort in the 
development in Archive Fever, and related Derridean texts, of something of a rejoinder to 
DVVRFLDWLRQRIDUFKLYDOVFLHQFHDQGµPDWHULDOLW\¶ It is necessary to begin again, not with arkhé, 
but with another, similarly complex term ± hypomnesis ³>O@HWXV never forget´'HUULGDZDUQV 
³this Greek distinction between mneme or anamnesis on the one hand, and hypomnema on the 
RWKHU7KHDUFKLYHLVK\SRPQHVLF´26. In doing so, I will endeavour to revive a theme that has 







If the legal discourse addressing Archive Fever is sparse, the acknowledgement in that 
discourse of the psychoanalytic theme of the essay is virtually non-existent28. This is surprising. 
$GPLWWHGO\'HUULGDVD\V)UHXGKDGQRµFRQFHSW¶RIWKHarchive any more than we do29; but 
QHYHUWKHOHVV ³)UHXGLDQ SV\FKRDQDO\VLV SURSRVHV D QHZ WKHRU\ RI WKH DUFKLYH LW WDNHV LQWR
account a topic and a death drive without which there would not in effect be any desire or any 
possibility for the archive´30. This is to state matters quite boldly; but it is further surprising 
WKDWOHJDOGLVFRXUVHGRHVQRWDVVRFLDWHWKLVµGHDWKGULYH¶ZKLFKPDNHVWKHDUFKLYHSRVVLEOHZLWK
the question of the law, particularly of legal violence. Renisa Mawani, for example, delivers a 
³PDWHULDOUHDGLQJRIODZDVDUFKLYH´ZKLFKVKHH[SODLQV³UHTXLUHVDUHDGLQJRI'HUULGD¶V«
PHGLWDWLRQVRQWKHDUFKLYHDORQJVLGHDQGWKURXJKµ)RUFHRI/DZ¶´310DZDQL¶VSRLQWKHUHLVWR
LGHQWLI\WKHµGRXEOHORJLFRIYLROHQFH¶LQKHUHQWLQWKHDUFKLYHDVVKHUHDGVLW± a reading that 
would align the archival function of the law with the memorial or ideological function of the 
State, in particular the colonial State. While my assimilation of law and archive will be 
narrower and independent from State theory (which, epistemologically, is to complicate things 
VRPHZKDWWKLVLVDQDSSURSULDWHDQDORJ\'HUULGDH[SOLFLWO\VD\VRIWKHDUFKLYHWKDW³LWKDVWKH
IRUFHRIODZ´DQGWKH%HQMDPLQLDQCritik der Gewalt provides a gloss to that force, even in 
Archive Fever ZKLFK LV FRQFHUQHG ZLWK ³WKH YLROHQFH RI WKH DUFKLYH LWVHOI as archive, as 
DUFKLYDOYLROHQFH´: 
 
³«every DUFKLYH«LVDWRQFH institutive and conservative. Revolutionary and traditional. An 
eco-nomic archive in this double sense: it keeps, it puts in reserve, it saves, but in an unnatural 
fashion, that is to say in making the law (nomosRUPDNLQJSHRSOHUHVSHFWWKHODZ«´32 
 
,QHVVHQFHDUFKLYDOYLROHQFHUHIOHFWVWKHLQWHUSOD\EHWZHHQWKHOHJDOYLROHQFHRI%HQMDPLQ¶V
critique: one must preserve the archivHLQRUGHUWRPDNHDQµLQLWLDO¶DXWKRULWDWLYHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ
and such an interpretation is always slightly out of line with hitherto recorded precedent, a fresh 
interpretation and a new inscription each time. And this double violence is set in motion in 
memory as for law according to precisely the same deconstructive spirit that animated Force 
of Law: namely, the rejection of logocentrism, RIµSUHVHQFH¶-XVWDVWKHUHLVQRauthorisation, 
E\DQ\µDQWHULRUOHJLWLPDF\¶RIWKHRULJLQDU\ violence that founds the law, there is no possibility 
in the psychoanalytic context of a spontaneous memory, no possibility of gaining access to the 




³WKHDUFKLYHLIWKLVZRUGRUWKLVILJXUHFDQEHVWDELOL]HGVR as to take on a signification, will 
never be either memory or anamnesis as spontaneous, alive and internal experience. On the 
contrary: the archive takes place at the place of originary and structural breakdown of the said 
PHPRU\´33. 
The absence of the internal experience, like the absence of the legal origin, necessitates 
DQ LQFHVVDQW SURFHGXUH ZKHUHE\ WKH DUFKLYH LV µVHOHFWHG¶ LPSULQWHG LWV PDWHULDO UHFDOOHG. 
1RWDEO\WKLVLVQRWDTXHVWLRQRIVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGUHFDOODOWKRXJK³WKHZRUGDQGWKHQRWLRQRI 
the archive seem at first, admittedly, to point towards the past, to refer to the signs of consigned 
PHPRU\ WR UHFDOO IDLWKIXOQHVV WR WUDGLWLRQ´34 the archive, presumably for want of origins, 
operates differently: ³>L@WLVDTXHVWLRQRIWKHIXWXUHWKHTuestion of the future itself, the question 
RIDUHVSRQVHRIDSURPLVHDQGRIDUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWRPRUURZ´35. Another parallel, then, with 
the promise ³SHUKDSV´ of justice that comes with the deconstruction of the law; but one in 
which it is now the past, and not justice to the particular, that may, one day, be redeemed; and 
aside which we place the interpretive force of the archivist-archon, always both falling short 
of true mnesis and acting upon this responsibility to execute every archival inscription 
regardless.  
 But what is it, then, that compels this interplay of archival violence, of past and future? 
It is this question, I think, that ushers in the commensurability RIµarchive¶ and µlaw¶; and I 
WKLQNWKDWWKH\NH\FDQEHIRXQGLQ'HUULGD¶Vconjuring, at the same time as analysing archival 
violence, of the pseudo-)UHXGLDQµGHDWKGULYH¶. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud finally 
capitulated to theories of a death instinct (advanced in its most sophisticated form by Spielrein36 
some decade earlier), stating that ³WKHDLPRIDOOOLIHLVGHDWK´and that the human instinct is to 
³UHWXUQWRWKHLQDQLPDWHVWDWH´37. This instinct stands opposite the conservative instincts in a 
seemingly contradictory fashion, owing to the drive of the organism to GLHµLQLWVRZQZD\¶38. 
Importantly, for Derrida, the death drive is mute: 
 
³It is at work, but since it always operates in silence, it never leaves any archives of its own. It 
destroys in advance its own archive, as if that were in truth the very motivation of its most 
proper movement. It works to destroy the archive: on the condition of effacing but also with a 





Although it is nowhere stated in the text, this drive that leaves nothing behind is precisely in 
line, not with law-preserving or law-founding violence, but with the divine violence of 
%HQMDPLQ¶s Critique: a non-legal violence that leaves no trace. Likewise is the death drive in 
relation to the archive:  
 
³7KLV GULYH« VHHPV QRW RQO\ WR EH DQDUFKLF DQDUFKRQWLF« WKH GHDWK GULYH LV DERYH DOO
anarchivic, one could say, or archiviolithic. It will always have been archive-destroying, by 
VLOHQWYRFDWLRQ´40 
 
The violence which threatens law with wholesale destruction is therefore similar to an 
archiviolithic death drive, an archive-destroying drive; and this is precisely so because the 
instinct towards death is also an instinct towards forgetting: 
 
³$VWKHGHDWKGULYHLVDOVRDFFRUGLQJWRWKHPRVWVWULNLQJZRrds of Freud himself, an aggression 
DQG D GHVWUXFWLRQ« GULYH LW QRW RQO\ LQFLWHV IRUJHWIXOQHVV DPQHVLD WKH DQQLKLODWLRQ RI
memory, as mneme or anamnesis, but also commands the radical effacement, in truth the 
eradication, of that which can never be reduced to mneme or to anamnesis, that is, the archive, 
consignation, the documentary or monumental apparatus as hypomnema«´41 
 
7KXV VD\V 'HUULGD WKH GHDWK GULYH ³WKUHDWHQV HYHU\ SULQFLSDOLW\ HYHU\ DUFKRQWLF SULPDF\
every DUFKLYDOGHVLUH,WLVZKDWZHZLOOFDOO«OHPDOG¶DUFKLYH ³DUFKLYHIHYHU´«´42. Indeed, 
WKHUHLV³QRDUFKLYHIHYHUZLWKRXWWKHWKUHDWRIWKLVGHDWKGULYH´QRDUFKLYHGHVLUH³ZLWKRXWWKH
possibility of a forgetfulness which does not limit itself to represVLRQ´43. The drive of death and 
forgetting, which here threatens conscious memory with the obliterating force of forgetfulness, 
is is one part of an aporetic double. The other part is the libidinal, creative repetition 
compulsion: the desire with which the SV\FKLFDODSSDUDWXVµFUHDWHVDUFKLYHV¶,QRWKHUZRUGV
³DUFKLYHIHYHU´VLJQLILHVWKHSDUDGR[LFDOWKUHDWWRWKHDUFKLYHIURPwithin the archive; and the 
simultaneous yearning iteratively to produce archives: 
 
³:HDUHHQPDOG¶DUFKLYHLQQHHGRIDUFKLYHV«to be HQPDOG¶DUFKLYH can mean something 
HOVHWKDQWRVXIIHUIURPDVLFNQHVV«LWLVWREXUQZLWKDSDVVLRQ,WLVQHYHUWRUHVWLQWHUPLQDEO\
from searching for the archive right where it slips away. It is to run after the archive, even if 
WKHUH¶VWRRPXch of it, right where something in it anarchives itself. It is to have a compulsive, 
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repetitive, and nostalgic desire to return to the origin, a homesickness, a nostalgia for the return 
WRWKHPRVWDUFKDLFSODFHRIDEVROXWHFRPPHQFHPHQW´44 
 
Let us leave the detail of the text for now, and pause RQWKDWµQRVWDOJLFGHVLUHWRUHWXUQWRWKH
RULJLQ¶-XVWDV.DIND¶VBefore the Law introduces the demi-P\WKRIDGRRUWKDWOLHVRSHQµRQO\
IRUXV¶DQGWKDWWKHUHIRUHbeckons to us45, calling us by name and summoning us towards the 
law; likewise the threat to the archive by the archiviolithic instinct for forgetting instigates a 
compulsion towards the lost origin: one which cannot be satisfied and which is transferred 
instead to the production of hypomnemic archives ± always less than memory, always a 
substitute for the origin. Even more than a yearning ± this compulsion is described in the latter 
pages of the essay even as an injunction: 'HUULGDVSHDNVRIDQ³LQMXQFWLRQWRUHPHPEHUWKe 
IXWXUH´ DQ ³DUFKRQWLF LQMXQFWLRQ WR JXDUG DQG WR JDWKHU WKH DUFKLYH´46. In the form of the 
injunction, the death drive propagates an internalised order, something in the form of a 
command from within. 
 The relationship of this interplay of the violence of forgetting and hypomnesis with the 
modern law is precisely this: the law is threatened by the forgetfulness of its origin, and issues 
to itself an injunction to recall the same. The continuous invocation of legal origins, which is a 
continuous appeal to memory; together with the impossibility of a return to the now-necessary 
origin (in the form of the rule of law) ± all of this menaces the law from within, threatening it 
with the force of destruction, which is the same as the force of forgetting. In a wholesale 
forgetfulness of its origins, law is indistinguishable from command or violence or politics47 
and must continuously re-inscribe an inadequate memory into every normative moment. 
 Now, in some respects, this is deconstruction as usual, which in turn is nothing that an 
interlocutor like Vismann does not already know. But it seems that there is an important caveat 
here when it comes to ³the law´. Usually, deconstructive accounts of legal phenomena gravitate 
to the critical or exceptional moments of law: the violence of the decision when presented with 
the particular48; or the act of signing, in the name of the People, the constitutive text of legal 
and political authority49. Not so with the archive. And the reason is this: there is an urgency 
that drives deconstruction as justice, as it is presented to us in Force of Law: ³WKHXUJHQF\WKDW
REVWUXFWVWKHKRUL]RQRINQRZOHGJH´50³-XVWLFH´'HUULGDWHOOVXV³GRHVQ¶WZDLW´DQGWKLVLV
just because of what the (im)possible instance of justice is (or, more precisely, might become). 
The plane of calculability that sits opposite justice yet in relation to it ± the plane of the law ± 
is not subject to that compulsion. However, I would suggest that internally to the law, there is 
a determinate need to VWDWH WKH RULJLQ 7KLV LV ZKDW UHQGHUV VRPHWKLQJ OLNH ³WKH ODZ´
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commensurate with the archive: the need to recall, not just what has gone before, but the very 
possibility of origins, which is the verso of the blank space presented to us by the radical 
absence of origin; and of the continuous threat to precarious hympomnemata of prior norms or 
rules: that we might forget these substitutes where they are occluded by politics, violence or 
sovereign command.  
And, of course, in circumstances similar to the inability of the psychoanalytic process 
to gain true access to spontaneous memory or lived experience in psychoanalysis, the law must 
nevertheless refuse to persist without memory of its origins; it must issue, and respond to, an 
injunction. For Derrida, 
 
³7KH LQMXQFWLRQ >WR UHPHPEHUDJDLQVW IRUJHWWLQJ@ HYHQ ZKHQ LW VXPPRQV PHPRU\ RU WKH
safeguard of the archive, turns incontestably toward the future to come. It orders to promise, 
but it orders repetition, and first of all self-repetition, self-FRQILUPDWLRQ«´51 
 
Likewise, the iterative self-confirmation of the law is carried out in the re-inscription of the 
origin at every stage of rule-making in positive legal systems (the Kelsenian and Hartian 
models, for example). The content of the norm is separated from its form in positivism; and it 
is precisely this formal structure that allows legal rules to summon an origin that is, as we saw 
in Force of Law, neither truly anterior nor ever guaranteed, but which demonstrates the logic 
of the archive. $QGMXVWDVWKH³SURVWKHVLV´RIWKHhympomnemic substrate forms (as we shall 
see) the basis of the hypomnesic UHFROOHFWLRQLQ)UHXG¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKHWunderblock, so too 
does the law subsist on the basis of a falsified, or simulacral memory of origins ± Derrida 
reminds us in Force of Law of Montaigne, for whom the lack of appeal to any natural law 
forces legal positivism to invent its fictitious supplement, like ³ZRPHQ ZKR XVH LYRU\
WHHWK«IRUJH>VRPH@ZLWKVRPHIRUHLJQPDWHULDO´52. 
 To address the dual problematic I raised at the conclusion of the previous section, then: 
deconstruction may easily pertain to the quotidian, internal structure of the law53; and 
moreover, given the inability of the latter to look for grounding authority outside of its own 
µXQFRQVFLRXV¶RU UHSUHVVHGPHPRULHVRIRULJLQ WKH³ODZ´SURSHUO\VR-called, or at least the 
version of the modern law that exists in tension with justice, is archival. The domain of 
approximated legal origins is reflected, then, in the first movement in which hypomnesis 
emerges in relation to the archive ± as something less than memory. Again placing 






archive, of the substrate or the subjectile which, in what is already a psychic spacing, cannot 
be reduced to memory: neither to memory as conscious reserve, nor to memory as 
rememoration, as an act of recalling. The psychic archive comes neither under mneme nor 
under anamnesis´54 
 
If the law becomes hypomnetic in its desire for, and falsification of, a memory of origins which 
it is forbidden nonetheless to forget; then it is also the case that there must be a method of 
falsification, a distancing of ³the law´ from the idea of the law. Hypomnesis invokes not simply 
DQ DSSUR[LPDWHG PHPRU\ EXW DOVR SUHFLVHO\ WKH µVXEVWUDWH¶ ZKLFK LV always in excess of 
memory. As for the nature of that excess ± that which is always falsified, like ivory teeth, in 
place of the origin ± we find a felicitous analogy in the prosthesis, the substrate which most 
prominently accompanies hypomnesis.  
 
Writing, Substrate and Non-Being 
 
In Archive Fever, Derrida refers back to an earlier piece55 LQZKLFKKHH[DPLQHV)UHXG¶VQRWH
on the Wunderblock. Much like a sophisticated palimpsest, this Victorian recording device 
consists in a piece of celluloid paper over a way tablet. An inscription made upon the paper, 
without the use of ink, leaves an impression on the underlying wax, and it will show upon the 
paper until the paper and wax are pulled apart and placed together again, blank and ready to 
begin anew. Not only does this apparatus allow for infinite use of its topmost surface ± which 
always returns to its pristine form: the inscription is each time retained permanently on the wax 
± if we remove the topmost layer, it is SRVVLEOHWRYLHZHYHU\KLVWRULFLQVFULSWLRQDWRQFHµXQGHU
FHUWDLQOLJKWV¶ 7KXVZHILQGD³GRXEOHV\VWHPFRQWDLQHGLQDVLQJOHDSSDUDWXV´56 of recording 
DQGHUDVXUH7KLV V\VWHP LV WR)UHXG¶VDSSDUHQWGHOLJKW, wholly analogous to the psychical 
DSSDUDWXVWKH³EHFRPLQJ-visible which alternates with the disappearance of what is written 
would be the flickering-XS« DQG SDVVLQJ-DZD\« RI FRQVFLRXVQHVV LQ WKH SURFHVV RI
SHUFHSWLRQ´57; while the wax that retains every inscription despite the refreshing of the topmost 
layer of the Wunderblock is analogous to the unconscious ± which is precisely what 
SV\FKRDQDO\VLVDLPVWRWDNHRXWDQGYLHZµXQGHUDFHUWDLQOLJKW¶ 
 ,W LVQRWFRLQFLGHQWDO WKDW WKLV³PDWHULDOLW\´RIZD[DQG WRSVKHHWPDNHV LWVZD\ LQWR
9LVPDQQ¶VJHQHDORJ\RI³ILOHV´ LQ WKHDFWRI µFDQFHOOLQJ¶ WKHFRPPDQG to delete is also a 
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command to displace the cancelled item with a fresh topsheet; while the development of wax 
inscription allows for an ever-more proximate relationship (due to the speed and immediacy of 
wax writing) of the record and the lived event. This appears to indicate, then, that the 
accompaniment of hypomnesis, as well as the law, is irreduciEO\ µPDWHULDO¶ Meanwile, 
deconstruction is not a study of material things ± and cannot possibly permit itself to be 
construed as such58. What does this suggest for the so-FDOOHGµRQWRORJ\¶RIODZ"How might the 
archive, and more specifically hypomnesis, if it is of the same nature as the law, help to define 
the ontology of the law, other than to differentiate the latter from itself as force or idea is 
differentiated from materiality?  
 In Dissemination, Derrida elaborates upon a fable within a fable: the legend of the god 
7KHXWKLQ'HUULGD¶VH[WHQVLRQ³7KRWK´DVLWHPHUJHVLQWKHPhaedrus under the heading The 
Inferiority of the Written to the Spoken Word. Theuth had offered King Thaumus a number of 
LQYHQWLRQVDPRQJZKLFKWKHIXQFWLRQRIZULWLQJZDVKHOGRXWDV³DQDFFRPSOLVKPHQW«ZKLFK
ZLOO LPSURYH ERWK WKH ZLVGRP DQG WKH PHPRU\ RI WKH (J\SWLDQV´59. Thaumas rebukes this 
extollation of writing, however, VLQFHZKDW7KRWKKDVGLVFRYHUHG³LV a receipt for recollection, 
QRWPHPRU\´LQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIZKLFK³SXSLOVZLOOKDYHWKHUHSXWDWLRQIRU>ZLVGRP@ZLWKRXW
WKH UHDOLW\´ WKH\ZLOO EH ³WKRXJKWYHU\NQRZOHGJHDEOHZKHQ WKH\DUH«TXLWH LJQRUDQW´60. 
Opposed to writing is speech, which ³EHKDYHs like someone attended in origin and present in 
SHUVRQ´. Unmediated, speech is intimately connected to the thought of the speaker, and capable 
of announcing truth and lived experience. It is guaranteed, in other words, by presence; whereas 
writing is only the simulacrum of memory, which can only be false: hypomnesis. 
 WhiOH WKHUH LVQRW VSDFHKHUH WRDQDO\VH WKHSDWK WKDW'HUULGD WUDFHV IURP6RFUDWHV¶
speech back to the supplement of the text61ZKDWLVLQWHUHVWLQJIRUWKHTXHVWLRQRIµPDWHULDOLW\¶
LV'HUULGD¶VIXUWKHULQYHVWLJDWLRQof this figure of Theuth/Thoth. In the Socratic formulation, 
speech is attended by presence and thus, ³[l]ike any person, the logos-zoon KDVDIDWKHU´62, a 
Pater that is the chief, the capital and the good. But VLQFHLV³QRPRUHSRVVLEOHWRORRN>WKHVH
paternal things] in the face than to stare aWWKHVXQ´63. 6RFUDWHVVR'HUULGDWHOOVXVZLOO³HYRNH
only the visible sun, the son that resembles the father, the analogon RIWKHLQWHOOLJLEOHVXQ«´64: 
WKDWZKLFKZHILQGE\ORRNLQJDWUHIOHFWLRQVLQWKHZDWHU³RUVRPHDQDORJRXVPHGLXP´65; that 
which H[LVWVLQWKH³analogous RUGHURIWKHVHQVLEOHRUYLVLEOH´66. This order, however, is never 
the thing in itself; but (as Giles Deleuze67 will tell us) the sum of so many planes of exteriority.  
Writing, apparently orphaned, has no access to the protection or guarantee of its author. 
And yet the Egyptian god of writing is also the god of the Moon, owing precisely to his 
SDWULOLQHDJHZKLFK³SXWV7KRWKLQ5D¶VSODFH as the moon takes the place of the sun. The god 
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of writing thus supplies the place of Ra, supplementing him and supplanting him in his absence 
DQGHVVHQWLDOGLVDSSHDUDQFH´68. Secondly, then: what difference is there, if any, between the 
analogous domain of water, the visible and the sensible, and the substitutive movement of the 
moon69? The sun withdraws each time, and escape from the play of substitution seems 
impossible. Finally, if speech is superior to writing because it is the unmediated sound of the 
³OLYLQJEUHDWK´³LWJRHVZLWKRXWVD\LQJWKDWWKHJRGRIZULWLQJ PXVWDOVREHWKHJRGRIGHDWK´70. 
%XW µGHDWK¶ far from being simple nonexistence or cessation of life, is the ³Srerequisite, or 
even the experience, of that face-to-IDFHHQFRXQWHU´71 with the paternal sun, God the father.  
 This figure determines the nature, the materiality, of writing: for writing is the 
supplement of the living voice, of memory and truth; and while ³the supplement is not, is not 
a being (on)´Lt is also, and ³nevertheless not a simple nonbeing (me on), either« [i]ts slidings 
slip it out of the simple alternative presence/absence. That is the danger´72. The supplement 
defies the opposition of being and non-being:  ³GDQJHURXV´ LQ Rousseau¶V IRUPODWLRQ
µGDQJHURXVVXSSOHPHQW¶ EHFDXVHLW³LVWKHLPDJHDQGWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRI1DWXUH«QHLWKHULQ
QRU RXW RI QDWXUH«´ DQG WKXV ³GDQJHURXV IRU«WKH QDWXUDO KHDOWK RI 5HDVRQ´73. And it is 
dangerous here because writing, the hypomnetic pharmakon, is a poison for memory, which it 
displaces with a simulacrum that allows repetition, but also forgetfulness and impotence, since 
the textual substrate is always alienable from true knowledge and wisdom74. 
 The play of absence and presence in the supplement of writing is replicated in the 
DUFKLYH GHVSLWH LWV µPDWHULDO¶ DSSHDUDQFH ,Q IDFW Derrida tells us, in the note on the 
Wunderblock ³)UHXGGRHVQRWH[SOLFLWO\H[DPLQHWKHVWDWXVRIWKH³PDWHULDOL]HG´VXSSOHPHQW
ZKLFKLVQHFHVVDU\WRWKHDOOHJHGVSRQWDQHLW\RIPHPRU\´75 but that, with these several layers 
± topsheet, wax, inscription ± and WKXV³>W@aking into account the multiplicity of regions in the 
psychic apparatus, this model [the Mystic Pad] also integrates the necessity, inside the psyche 
itself, of a certain outside, of certain bordeUVEHWZHHQ LQVLGHVDQGRXWVLGHV´76. Memory and 
reprHVVLRQFDQQRWLQWHUDFWZLWKRXWD³domestic ouWVLGH´GRPHVWLFEHFDXVHLWLVLQWHULRUWRWKH
SV\FKHEXW µRXWVLGH¶ WKH IXQFWLRQRIFRQVFLRXVQHVV7KXV)UHXGKDV LQWURGXFHG an ³internal 
substrate, surface, or space´³the idea of a psychic archive distinct from spontaneous memory, 
of a hypomnesis distinct from mneme and from anamnesis: the institution, in sum, of a 
prosthesis of the inside´77. And not only in the psychic apparatus:  
 
³7KHUHLVQRDUFKLYHZLWKRXWDSODFHof consignation, without a technique of repetition, and 




Of course, a differentiation of law and archive would say the same thing: the archive is exterior 
WRWKHODZ:KDWµGRPHVWLFDWHV¶WKHVXEVtrate, however, is the capacity of the latter to infect the 
logos: as with the psychic archive, so too with writing:  
 
³7KH³RXWVLGH´GRHVQRWEHJLQDWWKHSRLQWZKHUHZKDWZHQRZFDOOWKHSV\FKLFDQGWKHSK\VLFDO
meet, but at the point where the mneme, instead of being present to itself in its life as a 
PRYHPHQWRIWUXWKLVVXSSODQWHGE\WKHDUFKLYH«WKHVSDFHRIZULWLQJVSDFHas writing, is 
opened up in the violent movement of this surrogation, in the difference between mneme and 
hypomnesis. The outside is already within WKHZRUNRIPHPRU\´79 
 
2QFH DJDLQ KRZHYHU LVQ¶W WKLV VRPHWKLQJ DOUHDG\ ZHOO NQRZQ WR WKRVH ZKR ZRXOG
ontologically separate ± with a view to functionally recoupling ± ³ODZ DQG WKH DUFKLYH´"
Vismann is right, for example, to distinguLVK 'HUULGD¶V µWH[WXDO¶ WUHDWLVH IURP her own 
µPDWHULDO¶JHQHDORJ\%XWD methodological impasse is not the same as an indictment; and it 
seems that we still lack a sufficient description of any coterminous, synonymous relationship 
of archive and law80. What, then, might this interior exteriority, this (n)on-tology add to the 
wider issue? Does it breach the shores of its methodological confinement? 
If the matter admits of a solution, it is not only because of the priority of deconstruction 
to philosophy and to any possible jurisprudence: it is not even necessary to make that 
commitment, only to concede the force of the contradictions it unearths (excavates?) from time 
to time. Of course, 'HUULGD¶VVWUDWHJ\LVRIWHQWRDFFXVHPHWDSK\VLFLDns of their own textual 
dependency: in 3ODWR¶V3KDUPDF\for example, Socrates is a pharmacist-magician, even while 
he speaks; and his student Plato needs writing (hypomnesis) even to put forward something like 
dialectics ± which cannot therefore already exist µLQVFULEHGLQWKHVRXO¶. More apropos still for 
our purposes: for Plato, writing is emphatically necessary to the law: 
 
³7KLVQHFHVVLW\>RIUHSHWLWLRQWRUHPHPEHU@belongs to the order of the law and is posited by 
the Laws. In this instance, the immutable, petrified identity of writing is not simply added to 
WKH VLJQLILHG ODZ RU SUHVFULEHG UXOH OLNH D PXWH VWXSLG VLPXODFUXP LW DVVXUHV WKH ODZ¶V
permanence and identity with the vigilance of a guardian. As another sort of guardian of the 
laws, writing guarantees the means of returning at will, as often as necessary, to that ideal 





And so on: what follows this passage is a meticulous lineage of law and writing in Platonic 
discourse. Vismann never considers these grecocentric pages in Dissemination while 
GLVSHQVLQJ ZLWK 'HUULGD¶s pseudo-Roman ³,PSHULDO´ thesis, and we must wonder at what 
difference, if any, their inclusion might have made.  
 
Intersection: Law is Archival 
 
Since ³the lDZ´DQG³the DUFKLYH´VKDUH, under the pain of forgetting, a hypomnetic existence, 
they become not only inseparable, but commensurate. It is not simply that the archive is a 
juridical structure; but that the law itself is, and can only be, archival: with its hypomnetic, 
compulsive iteration of lost origins ± PHPRULHVRIWRPLVXVH$JDPEHQ³WKDWZKLFKKDVQHYHU
EHHQ´82. But also with its strange ontology, modern law is nothing more or less than its archival 
structure: guaranteeing, if not its origins, then the possibility of its perpetual effort to return to 
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